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SPARSE PATENT PROTECTION FOR RESEARCH TOOLS:
EXPANSION OF THE SAFE HARBOR HAS CHANGED THE
RULES
ABSTRACT
The protection provided by patent rights benefits society by encouraging
inventors to disclose their inventions, but these same rights can be wielded
against competitors through infringement suits, causing a chilling effect on
later innovation. In the field of pharmaceutical innovation, the Hatch-Waxman
Act’s safe harbor has provided a defense against infringement, allowing
generic manufacturers to quickly bring low-cost drugs to the public while
trespassing minimally on the patent holder’s rights. The Act’s delicate balance
of benefits and burdens has been threatened by recent judicial interpretations
of the provision’s scope. The scope of the safe harbor has been expanded to the
point that it reduces the value of patent protection for laboratory tools and
methods, and in turn threatens the patent system’s role in encouraging
innovation in these areas.
This Comment proposes limits to the safe harbor’s scope by (1) specifying
the types of inventions that are subject to the safe harbor and (2) permitting
those patents to be infringed only until FDA approval has been granted. This
proposed scope is supported by the legislative history, which referred
extensively to the FDA approval process and repeatedly assured drug
manufacturers that the purpose of the safe harbor was to reduce delays caused
by the FDA approval process. In addition, this scope comports with the
broader themes of patent law in that it promotes certainty in the law and
provides parties with notice of their rights. However, because the language
used in the safe harbor provision is expansive, textualist interpretations of the
provision alone tend to worsen rather than solve the problem. For this reason,
this Comment advocates legislative action to produce limits on the scope of the
safe harbor that will protect and encourage innovation while promoting early
access to generic drugs.
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INTRODUCTION
Inventors with groundbreaking ideas have the capacity to change the way
society operates—even improve others’ quality of life—simply by sharing
these ideas with the public. When the idea has been shared, however, nothing
prevents the public from using the idea without compensating the inventor
absent some law to the contrary. Inventors will not have an incentive to
disclose their inventions to the public if they cannot expect to receive anything
in return for their work. The framers of the U.S. Constitution understood this
quandary and granted Congress the power to issue exclusive rights to inventors
to practice their inventions “[t]o promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts.”1
Congress defined the exclusive patent rights broadly in the Patent Act of 1952,
securing for the inventor the exclusive rights to use, make, sell, or offer to sell
the patented invention.2 These exclusive rights create a form of monopoly
power, which allows an inventor to recoup the cost of innovation and
incentivizes further invention and research by the inventor and others. Certain
areas of innovation, such as pharmaceutical development, rely heavily on
patent protection due to the high cost of research. In addition, pharmaceutical
products are regulated by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), which
must approve all drugs before they can be sold to the public. Because the FDA
approval process for drugs requires clinical testing, the approval process for a
generic version of a drug involves “making” and “using” the drug. If the drug
is still covered by a patent, then these acts are infringing acts3: the generic
manufacturer simply cannot begin seeking FDA approval until the patent
expires.
This overlapping federal regulation in the area of pharmaceutical products
provided layers of monopoly protection for the holders of drug patents, to the
detriment of consumers. In 1984, Congress created a statutory experimental
use exception to patent infringement—the Hatch-Waxman “safe harbor”4—to
expedite the entry of generic drugs into the market. This exception involved a
delicate balancing of interests between patent owners and generic
manufacturers and made it possible for generic drugs to begin the FDA
approval process before the patents on the drugs expired. The safe harbor
1

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006) (creating an action for infringement against parties who “make[], use[],
offer[] to sell, or sell[]” the patented invention).
3 See id.
4 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98417, § 202, 98 Stat. 1585, 1603 (current version at 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)).
2
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created an exception to infringement permitting anyone to use a patented
invention, so long as the purpose of that use was related to submission of
information to the FDA.5 The scope of the safe harbor was long understood to
mean that patented drugs and medical devices could be used and experimented
with for purposes of seeking FDA approval,6 but that scope has been expanded
by the courts.
With its recent holding in Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Amphastar
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,7 the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has
expanded the scope of the safe harbor exception such that it now covers far
more than just drugs for which FDA approval is being sought.8 The safe harbor
now covers all uses of every sort of patented invention, and exempts these uses
from infringement suits so long as the use is related to information that could
ever be requested by the FDA.9 This expansion decreases the protection
available to patents on drug-related inventions, such as laboratory tools and
manufacturing methods (collectively, “research tools”), and consequently
reduces the inventor’s incentive to disclose these inventions through seeking
patent protection.10 This Comment argues that the scope of the Hatch-Waxman
safe harbor should be limited to cover only (1) patents on inventions regulated
by the FDA11 and (2) infringing actions leading up to FDA approval.12 The
first limitation is needed because allowing the safe harbor to cover the use of
research tools for their ordinary purpose creates the very distortion the safe
harbor was designed to correct. The second limitation is necessary to prevent
too great a reduction of patentees’ rights. Part I of this Comment examines the
factors Congress considered when enacting the safe harbor exception, and how
the courts have interpreted the provision. Part II formulates a revised scope of
the safe harbor by balancing congressional intent with interpretation of the text
of the safe harbor and overarching policy concerns unique to patent
5

See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).
See, e.g., Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005).
7 686 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2854 (2013).
8 Applying the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of the safe harbor exception from Momenta, the safe
harbor could cover the construction and launch of a patented satellite, if the satellite is used to submit
information to the FDA.
9 Momenta, 686 F.3d at 1359.
10 The quid pro quo of patent protection is disclosure of the invention to the public. Allowing the safe
harbor to cover research tools will decrease inventors’ reliance on patent protection for these inventions, which
are typically used only in the laboratory and thus amenable to trade secret protection.
11 Specifically, the safe harbor should cover only those inventions for which the Hatch-Waxman Act
granted patent term extensions. See 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
12 This limitation comports with Justice Scalia’s view in Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545
U.S. 193, 206–07 (2005) (citing Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 674 (1990)).
6
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jurisprudence. Finally, Part III of this Comment addresses the viability of this
revised scope and possible pathways for its induction into law.
I. HOW THE HATCH-WAXMAN SAFE HARBOR EXCEPTION DEVOLVED INTO
THE RULE
The safe harbor provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act began as the keystone
of a delicate congressional compromise but has since been expanded through
judicial interpretation into a one-size-fits-all defense to infringement in
pharmaceutical patent litigation.13 Because the safe harbor involves the highly
lucrative field of pharmaceutical products, the scope of the safe harbor has
been the subject of intense litigation. This Part first illustrates the factors that
influenced Congress’s deliberations regarding the Hatch-Waxman Act, then
discusses the relevant interpretations of the Act by the courts, and concludes by
analyzing the split of authority at the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
But before considering the scope of the Hatch-Waxman Act, it is important to
understand the factors that contributed to its passage.
A. Factors That Influenced Congress to Enact the Hatch-Waxman Act
Congress’s power to promote inventive activity is granted by the
Constitution.14 All of patent law hinges on this grant, and Congress has chosen
to exercise its power to both establish statutory regimes that protect inventions
and to update those statutes over time.15 Due to the high costs associated with
research and development, the pharmaceutical industry relies heavily on patent
protection and the limited monopoly it provides as a method of securing a
return on investment.16 Pharmaceutical products are also subject to strict
federal regulation by the FDA. These regulations and the protection provided
by patent law affected the market for pharmaceutical products in a unique way.

13 For cases interpreting the safe harbor provision, see, for example, Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. 661; Momenta,
686 F.3d 1348; and Classen Immunotherapies, Inc., v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert.
denied, 133 S. Ct. 973 (2013).
14 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.”).
15 See, e.g., Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, sec. 3(b)(1), § 102, 125 Stat. 284,
285 (2011) (amending 35 U.S.C. § 102).
16 In 2011, the pharmaceutical industry watched as patents expired on blockbuster drugs, leading to a loss
of monopoly profits close to $50 billion per year. See Duff Wilson, Patent Woes Threatening Drug Firms,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/07/business/07drug.html.

JONES GALLEYSPROOFS

754

1/31/2014 1:10 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 63:749

In 1984, Congress passed the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act (Hatch-Waxman Act) in response to two inequities caused by
overlapping FDA and Patent and Trademark Office regulations on drugs.17 The
first inequity addressed by the Hatch-Waxman Act was that drug patents were
mostly worthless for a portion of the patent term—until the FDA approves a
drug, it cannot be sold to the public.18 Any time between the patent issuing and
FDA approval was time lost to the patentee. The Hatch-Waxman Act solved
this issue by creating an extension of patent terms for time lost during
regulatory approval.19
The second inequity the Hatch-Waxman Act addressed was a prolongation
of protection for patented drugs.20 Because the Patent Act gave patentees the
right to stop others from making or using the patented invention,21 a generic
drug manufacturer would have to wait for the patent to expire before beginning
to seek FDA approval. The period of time between the patent’s expiration and
FDA approval effectively extended the patent monopoly. Consequently, this
delay in the release of generic drugs also resulted in higher prices charged for
patented drugs.22 Because the testing done for FDA approval is similar to basic
scientific research, it could be argued that this laboratory use should be
classified as “experimental use” under the common law, which permits uses
that are “philosophical” in nature rather than commercial.23 However, while
Congress was debating the Hatch-Waxman Act, the Federal Circuit held in

17 See Hatch-Waxman Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, §§ 201–202, 98 Stat. 1585, 1598–1603 (1984) (current
version at 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271(e) (2006 & Supp. V 2011)) (extending patent terms for inventors and
permitting the experimental use exception for generic producers).
18 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2012).
19 35 U.S.C. § 156.
20 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984: Hearing on S. 2748 Before the S.
Comm. on Labor & Human Res., 98th Cong. 1 (1984) [hereinafter Senate Hearing] (statement of Sen. Orrin
Hatch, Chairman, S. Comm. on Labor & Human Res.) (“[O]ur people are paying too much for drugs whose
patents have expired.”).
21 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (defining infringement).
22 This is not to say that higher prices are not the just reward for the hard labor and costs involved in
bringing a new drug to market, rather, that the public has paid the price long enough to compensate the
inventor for his investment. See Senate Hearing, supra note 20, at 54 (statement of William F. Haddad,
President & CEO, Generic Pharmaceutical Industry Association) (noting the availability of a generic
alternative for metronidazole cut the price of a dose by more than half, saving the Department of Defense
$1.1 million in one year (in 1983 U.S. dollars)).
23 See Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“[U]nlicensed
experiments conducted with a view to the adaptation of the patented invention to the experimentor’s business
is a violation of the rights of the patentee to exclude others from using his patented invention.”), superseded by
statute, Hatch-Waxman Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, § 202, 98 Stat. 1585, 1603 (1984) (codified at 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(e)(1)), as recognized in W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 977 F.2d 558 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co. that the common law
experimental use exception did not apply to research done in the course of
seeking FDA approval.24 Congress implicitly overruled the Federal Circuit by
creating its own exception to patent infringement in the Hatch-Waxman Act:
“It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell . . . a
patented invention . . . solely for uses reasonably related to the development
and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the
manufacture, use, or sale of drugs . . . .”25 In addition, the Hatch-Waxman Act
created an artificial form of infringement—triggered by submitting an
Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) to the FDA—with limited
remedies for the patentee, to speed the entry of generics into the market.26 The
language of this statute, however, is not a model of clarity.27 As a result, the
courts have been burdened with interpreting and clarifying the meaning and
scope of this provision.
B. Textualist Interpretations of the Safe Harbor by the Supreme Court
Section 202 of the Hatch-Waxman Act, also known as the safe harbor
provision, contains several unclear phrases that have been the source of intense
litigation.28 In the Supreme Court’s first consideration of the safe harbor
provision in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., it addressed the question of
whether medical devices are included within the definition of “drugs” for the
purposes of the safe harbor exception.29 Although medical devices are not
“drugs” (i.e., pharmaceutical products), Justice Scalia pointed to section 201 of
the Act, which gives patent term extensions to both medical devices and
pharmaceuticals.30 Justice Scalia analyzed the Hatch-Waxman Act as a whole,
and although medical devices are not listed in section 202, he found that
limiting the safe harbor to only drugs would cause an imbalance in the

24

See id.
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). Congress recognized it was overturning the Federal Circuit’s holding in Roche
with this legislation. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 60 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686,
2719–21, 1984 WL 37417.
26 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(e)(2)–(4) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
27 Justice Scalia pronounced the text of the safe harbor provision “not plainly comprehensible.” Eli Lilly
& Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 669 (1990).
28 See, e.g., Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 206–07 (2005) (interpreting the
phrase “reasonably related”); Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 665–66 (considering which “Federal law” is included in the
exemption).
29 See Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 669–74.
30 Id. at 670–71 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 156(f)).
25
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regulatory scheme.31 To counter this imbalance, the Court held all of the
inventions granted patent term extensions in section 201 were covered by the
safe harbor because they are all regulated by the same federal law.32 By
broadening the scope of the safe harbor, the Court maintained the “structural”
integrity of the statute.33
Fifteen years later, the Court again interpreted the safe harbor provision to
determine if the accused infringer must actually submit information to the FDA
to receive protection under the safe harbor.34 The patented compound in Merck
KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. was studied as a potential cancer therapy
drug, and the accused infringer, Merck, kept records of its preclinical
experiments.35 Merck decided to file for FDA approval several months after
the infringement suit was filed.36 Justice Scalia considered the implications of
requiring a researcher to predict whether a drug would work prior to
conducting preclinical trials.37 Justice Scalia also noted that “[b]asic scientific
research” with no eye toward developing a particular drug does not qualify as
“‘reasonably related to the development and submission of information’ to the
FDA.”38 Balancing these concerns, the Court held that the safe harbor should
cover research related to drug development, even when no FDA approval has
been sought:
Congress did not limit § 271(e)(1)’s safe harbor to the development
of information for inclusion in a submission to the FDA; nor did it
create an exemption applicable only to the research relevant to filing
an ANDA for approval of a generic drug. Rather, it exempted from
infringement all uses of patented compounds “reasonably related” to
the process of developing information for submission under any

31

See id. at 669–74.
See id.
33 Justice Scalia did not consider the “purpose” to be served by the statute, but his decision protected that
as well. See id. at 673–74 (noting the “perfect ‘product’ fit between the two sections” of the Hatch-Waxman
Act).
34 Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005).
35 Id. at 198–200.
36 Id. at 199–200.
37 See id. at 206 (“One can know at the outset that a particular compound will be the subject of an
eventual application the FDA only if the active ingredient in the drug being tested is identical to that in a drug
that has already been approved.” (emphasis added)).
38 Id. at 205–06. It is also important to note that Congress considered the phrase “directly related,” but
the final bill contained “reasonably related,” implying Congress intended a broader scope. See H.R. REP. No.
98-857, pt. 2, at 60 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2720, 1984 WL 37417.
32
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federal law regulating the manufacture, use, or distribution of
39
drugs.

The Court further articulated that the standard for measuring whether an
infringer’s actions were “reasonably related” enough to trigger section 202 is
based on the infringer’s reasonable belief:
At least where a drugmaker has a reasonable basis for believing that a
patented compound may work, through a particular biological
process, to produce a particular physiological effect, and uses the
compound in research that, if successful, would be appropriate to
include in a submission to the FDA, that use is “reasonably related”
to the “development and submission of information under . . . Federal
40
law.”

Thus, the applicability of the safe harbor exception is predicated on a
reasonableness standard.41 Justice Scalia noted the unresolved question of
whether the safe harbor applies to “research tools”—inventions primarily
designed for use in a laboratory setting—but refrained from addressing the
question directly.42
C. Early Federal Circuit Interpretation of the Safe Harbor
The Federal Circuit has also been active in interpreting the Hatch-Waxman
safe harbor. The Federal Circuit is an “expert court” and serves as the appellate
court for all patent-related cases, and its holdings have an immediate impact on
federal district courts across the nation.43 Relying on the Supreme Court’s
reasoning in Eli Lilly, it has extended the safe harbor to all medical products,
even those not granted patent term extensions.44 This broadening was
necessary to avoid inconsistency: if “Federal law” means an entire regulatory

39

Merck, 545 U.S. at 206 (citing Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 674 (1990)).
Id. at 207 (omission in original) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006)).
41 It is unsurprising that an exception to infringement would operate unlike the infringement provision
itself, which is based on strict liability and not on reasonableness. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (defining
infringement without mentioning scienter).
42 The question regarding “research tools” was not before the Court, but the Court’s rationale could
suggest that the safe harbor would not apply because a researcher would not seek FDA approval for the tool
itself. See Merck, 545 U.S. at 205 n.7.
43 One of Congress’s purposes in establishing the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was “to
improve the administration of the patent law by centralizing appeals in patent cases.” S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 2
(1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 12, 1981 WL 21373.
44 See Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 669–74; AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1029 (Fed. Cir. 1997),
amended by 131 F.3d 1009 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
40
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scheme, e.g., the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,45 then the safe
harbor’s coverage cannot be limited to only those products given patent term
extensions, which are the drugs and devices requiring premarket FDA
approval.46 In extending the scope of applicable patented inventions, the
Federal Circuit retained the limitation that the “use” of the invention be the
type of use required for FDA approval.47
The Federal Circuit later qualified this broad scope in Proveris Scientific
Corp. v. Innovasystems, Inc., which involved the use of a patented device in
laboratory experiments.48 The court held that the infringer’s use of a patented
invention to develop information for the FDA did not qualify for the safe
harbor when the invention was not subject to FDA approval itself.49 Neither
the patented invention nor the infringing application of the invention in
Proveris was submitted to the FDA for approval as a medical device.50 Instead,
the accused infringer made and sold a research tool that applied the patented
invention—a tool that would be useful in developing new medical products.51
The court held that because FDA approval would not be sought for the
infringing device, making and selling the device were actions not covered by
the safe harbor.52 In addition, the court noted that the patent was directed to an
invention that would not suffer from time lost during FDA approval, and thus
it was not a “patented invention” that the safe harbor should cover.53
D. Discord at the Federal Circuit: Classen and Momenta
More recently, the Federal Circuit has addressed the question of whether
“routine reporting” to the FDA of information, unrelated to an application for
approval of a medical product, counts as “reasonably related” for the purposes

45

See 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 (2012).
AbTox, 122 F.3d at 1027–29.
47 Id. at 1030 (equating the “use” of the invention with “activities” performed with the invention).
48 536 F.3d 1256, 1265–66 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
49 See id.
50 See id.
51 The classic example of a “research tool” is a microscope: it is an invention worth patenting but is
useful only in its ability to aid in further research. See id.; Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 496
F.3d 1334, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Rader, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (comparing “research
tools” to microscopes).
52 See Proveris, 536 F.3d at 1265–66.
53 Id. The reasoning here is parallel to that of Justice Scalia in Eli Lilly—that the structure of the HatchWaxman Act implies this relationship between patent term extensions and the safe harbor exception. See Eli
Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 669–74 (1990).
46

JONES GALLEYSPROOFS

2014]

1/31/2014 1:10 PM

SPARSE PATENT PROTECTION FOR RESEARCH TOOLS

759

of the safe harbor exception.54 The patented invention in Classen
Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC consisted of a method for evaluating
and improving the safety of immunization schedules.55 The accused infringer
kept a record of negative relationships between vaccines and reported this
information to the FDA in conformance with FDA regulations.56 The panel’s
majority surveyed the relevant legislative history of the Hatch-Waxman Act
and noted that the purpose and intent of Congress in enacting the Act was to
create an exception for drug testing “in preparation for seeking FDA approval
if marketing of the drug would occur after expiration of the patent.”57 The
majority applied the Supreme Court’s analysis from Merck and Eli Lilly, which
was that the safe harbor exception “leaves adequate space for experimentation
and failure on the road to regulatory approval”58 and “allows competitors, prior
to the expiration of a patent, to engage in otherwise infringing activities
necessary to obtain regulatory approval.”59 Based on these phrases, the
majority in Classen concluded that the safe harbor should cover only activities
leading up to FDA approval.60 The majority further recognized and dismissed
Judge Moore’s dissenting view that the submission of “any” information to the
FDA triggers the safe harbor exception.61 Specifically, the majority held that
the routine submission of post-approval drug reactions did not fall within the
safe harbor exception.62
Judge Moore authored the dissent in Classen, which was later adopted by
the Federal Circuit in Momenta,63 relying on the text of § 271(e)(1) itself,
along with other views expressed in Merck, to support a holding that the safe
harbor is a broad exception to infringement:
[T]he statutory text makes clear that it provides a wide berth for the
use of patented drugs in activities related to the federal regulatory
54 See Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1070 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“The
statute does not apply to information that may be routinely reported to the FDA . . . .”), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct.
973 (2013).
55 See id.
56 See id.
57 Id. at 1071 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 15 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647,
2648, 1984 WL 37416) (internal quotation mark omitted).
58 Id. (quoting Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 207 (2005)).
59 Id. (quoting Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 671 (1990)) (internal quotation mark
omitted).
60 Id. at 1072.
61 Id. at 1072 n.4.
62 Id. at 1072.
63 See Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. denied,
133 S. Ct. 2854 (2013).
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process. As an initial matter, we think it is apparent from the statutory
text that § 271(e)(1)’s exemption from infringement extends to all
uses of patented inventions that are reasonably related to the
64
development and submission of any information under the FDCA.

Applying this reasoning, the dissent also determined that the safe harbor
should not apply, but only because the infringing administration of the drug
was distinct from reporting adverse drug reactions to the FDA—thus the
activity was not “solely” related to submission of this information.65
The most recent Federal Circuit case involving the safe harbor exception—
with Judge Moore writing for the majority and Chief Judge Rader dissenting—
expanded the safe harbor along the lines of Judge Moore’s dissent in Classen.66
The patented invention in Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Amphastar
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. was a method for determining the purity of a batch of a
particular drug.67 The accused infringer produced batches of the drug,
measured the purity using the patented method, and submitted the results in an
ANDA to the FDA.68 After obtaining FDA approval of the drug, the accused
infringer produced larger quantities of the drug in preparation for sale to the
public, analyzing the purity of each batch using the patented method.69
Applying the reasoning from Classen, the district court found that the uses of
the patented method prior to FDA approval were covered by the safe harbor,
while later uses for production in preparation for sale were not covered.70
The Federal Circuit majority in Momenta analyzed the safe harbor
exception anew, starting with a textualist approach.71 Comparing the broad
language of § 271(e)(1) with the much more specific language in the very next

64 Classen, 659 F.3d at 1083 (Moore, J., dissenting) (quoting Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I,
Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 202 (2005)).
65 See id. at 1084.
66 Compare Momenta, 686 F.3d 1348, with Classen, 659 F.3d at 1075–76, 1084.
67 Momenta, 686 F.3d at 1351.
68 The major benefit of an ANDA is that the new drug must simply be the bioequivalent of the approved
drug, and extensive clinical trials are not required. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2012) (establishing the
requirements of an ANDA); Momenta, 686 F.3d at 1351.
69 There were methods for testing purity other than the patented method. See Momenta, 686 F.3d at 1353
(alleging that the existence of other methods meant the patented method was not required by the FDA, and
thus not covered by the safe harbor).
70 Information regarding the purity of each batch of the drug must be submitted to the FDA—exactly the
sort of routine, post-approval activity Classen held as beyond the scope of the safe harbor. See Momenta
Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 882 F. Supp. 2d 184, 196 (D. Mass. 2011) (citing Classen, 659 F.3d at
1071), vacated, 686 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2854 (2013).
71 Momenta, 686 F.3d at 1353–54.
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provision, § 271(e)(2), the court found it clear that Congress intended the safe
harbor to be broadly construed.72 The court confirmed this analysis by
reference to the broad language in Eli Lilly and Merck.73 The court then
addressed the issues of whether the information was “developed and
submitted” as required by the safe harbor, and whether the information was
“routine,” and thus not covered according to Classen.74 The FDA required that
the drug manufacturer produce and keep this information for continued
marketing approval, and thus the court was able to distinguish these records
from the records kept in Classen, which were maintained but not required by
the FDA on a regular basis.75 The court compared the drug purity information
to the records made in Merck, which were records of laboratory test results,
and found that the recordkeeping satisfied the “submission” requirement in
both cases—thus finding that developing submission-worthy records counts as
a “submission,” regardless of whether the records are ever submitted.76 The
court held that because the information obtained by using the patented method
was the kind of information required by the FDA for continued approval of the
drug, the infringement came within the safe harbor exception.77 Issues that did
not factor in the court’s reasoning were whether alternative methods were
available,78 and the need to maintain statutory equilibrium.79
In his dissent, Chief Judge Rader disagreed strongly with the majority’s
interpretation of the safe harbor’s text.80 Beginning with an analysis of the
legislative history,81 the dissent looked to the problem Congress intended to
solve through the Hatch-Waxman Act.82 In so doing, the dissent was unable to
find any indication that the safe harbor provision was intended to cover
72

See id. at 1354–55.
See id. at 1355–56 (quoting Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 202 (2005); Eli
Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 666 (1990)).
74 Momenta, 686 F.3d at 1357–58; see Classen, 659 F.3d at 1071–72.
75 See Momenta, 686 F.3d at 1358; Classen, 659 F.3d at 1071–72.
76 See Momenta, 686 F.3d at 1357 (citing Merck, 545 U.S. at 208).
77 Id. at 1359.
78 See id. (“The safe harbor’s protection is not limited to the dire situation where the patented invention is
the only way to develop and submit the information.”).
79 Id. at 1361 (“The Supreme Court in Eli Lilly noted that equilibrium was not always achieved.” (citing
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 671–72 (1990))).
80 See id. at 1361–62 (Rader, C.J., dissenting).
81 It is worth noting that in 1984, Chief Judge Rader was serving as Chief Counsel to the Senate Judiciary
Committee, which produced an early version of the Hatch-Waxman Act. See Randall R. Rader, Chief Judge,
U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FED. CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/randall-r-rader-chief-judge.html
(last visited Jan. 12, 2014).
82 Momenta, 686 F.3d at 1362–66 (Rader, C.J., dissenting) (citing to and quoting from multiple
congressional reports).
73
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anything other than preapproval submissions of information to the FDA to
speed the entry of generic medical products to the market.83 The dissent also
took issue with the majority’s construction of the terms “solely” and
“submission,” and predicted that this broader interpretation would render
patents on research tools worthless.84 Additionally, the dissent disagreed with
the majority’s interpretation of binding precedent, noting several quotations
from Eli Lilly and Merck that were taken out of context to support the
broadened view of the statute.85
The Federal Circuit’s decisions in Classen and Momenta are in significant
tension with one another, if not wholly irreconcilable. This is a form of intracircuit split not uncommon at the Federal Circuit.86 Inconsistencies in
interpretation such as this further the view of the Federal Circuit as a paneldependent institution.87 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has declined to
review these two cases, leaving the law in a state of disarray.
II. ADVOCATING FOR AN APPROPRIATE SCOPE OF THE SAFE HARBOR
This Comment seeks both to develop an appropriate scope for applying the
Hatch-Waxman Act’s safe harbor and to measure this scope against the Federal
Circuit’s most recent interpretation of the safe harbor in Momenta.88 Because
statutory construction does not occur in a vacuum, within the broader concept
of the safe harbor’s “scope” this Comment focuses on two aspects of the safe
harbor. The first is the time during which the safe harbor should apply, and the
second is the subject matter—types of patents—that the safe harbor ought to
cover.
A. Frames of Reference for Fixing the Safe Harbor’s Scope
The conflicting holdings of cases addressing the safe harbor statute center
around the phrase “solely for uses reasonably related to the development and

83

Id. at 1366.
Id. at 1367–69.
85 Id. at 1372–74 (quoting Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 205–07 (2005); Eli
Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 666 (1990)).
86 See Timothy R. Holbrook, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Interest in Patent Law, 3 IP THEORY 62,
69 (2013), http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ipt/vol3/iss2/1.
87 See R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment
of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1112 (2004) (finding that the Federal Circuit’s decisions on
claim construction are panel dependent).
88 Momenta, 686 F.3d 1348.
84
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submission of information” to the FDA.89 To properly construe this portion of
the safe harbor provision, this Comment analyzes the legislative history, looks
to the text and structure of the statute, and considers the implications of a broad
versus a narrow reading of the statute.
1. Survey of the Act’s Legislative History
Because the Hatch-Waxman Act involved significant changes to the
regulatory scheme both in the Patent and Trademark Office and in the Food
and Drug Administration, several prominent representatives of the drug
industry participated in the congressional hearings that shaped the Act.90
Congress understood the realities of the diminished protection for experimental
use,91 and members of Congress had heard from their constituents, many of
whom were in dire straits due to high drug costs.92 The goal of the legislation
was to provide a balanced solution to unique problems experienced by
pharmaceutical companies because of overlapping governmental regulatory
schemes.93 The Act struck this balance by providing patent term extensions for
innovations delayed by FDA approval,94 by creating an experimental use
exception,95 and by creating a new form of drug application for generic drugs
to speed their entry into the market.96 Both manufacturers of patented drugs
and manufacturers of generic drugs testified to their understanding that the
89 See, e.g., Momenta, 686 F.3d at 1354 (italics removed) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006));
Classen Immunotherapies, Inc., v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1070 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(e)(1)), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 973 (2013).
90 Drug Legislation: Hearing on H.R. 1554 and H.R. 3605 Before the Subcomm. on Health & the Env’t
of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 98th Cong. 42–45 (1983) [hereinafter House Hearing] (statement of
Kenneth N. Larsen, Chairman, Generic Pharmaceutical Industry Association); Senate Hearing, supra note 20,
at 65–66 (statement of Robert A. Ingram, Vice President for Public Affairs, Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.).
91 While the Hatch-Waxman Act was being debated, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held
that the affirmative defense of experimental use did not extend to drug manufacturing, which it found was a
commercial activity. See Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984),
superseded by statute, Hatch-Waxman Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, § 202, 98 Stat. 1585, 1603 (1984) (codified at
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006)), as recognized in W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 977 F.2d 558
(Fed. Cir. 1992); see also text accompanying note 23.
92 See Senate Hearing, supra note 20, at 104 (statement of Sen. Paula Hawkins).
93 See id. at 1–2 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch, Chairman, S. Comm. on Labor & Human Resources)
(“First, our people are paying too much for drugs whose patents have expired. Second, the domestic drug
industry is gradually losing its once-unchallenged prominence in pharmaceutical innovation . . . .”).
94 Extending the patent term increases the benefit provided by a patent, thereby increasing the incentive
to innovate. See 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
95 Id. § 271(e)(1). Congress expressly intended to overturn Roche. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2,
at 27 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2711, 1984 WL 37417.
96 35 U.S.C. § 156.
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Hatch-Waxman Act would allow for generics to begin the approval process
prior to expiration of the patented drug, with marketing and sale to follow only
after the patent expires.97
The congressional record is replete with statements from consumer
advocates, pharmaceutical companies, and lawmakers all affirming that the
Hatch-Waxman Act represents a well-crafted compromise to the benefit of all
parties involved.98 Some pharmaceutical manufacturers did not approve of the
experimental-use aspect of the compromise, arguing that it represented an
unconstitutional “taking” of their right to exclude others from making and
using their patented inventions in violation of the Fifth Amendment.99 Without
conceding that a “taking” would occur, Congress addressed these concerns by
noting that it was balancing the loss of right for these inventions by creating an
extension of the patent term, effectively granting additional rights.100 Congress
further emphasized that “[t]he information which can be developed under [the
safe harbor] provision is the type which is required to obtain approval of the
drug,”101 and that “the only activity which will be permitted by the bill is a
limited amount of testing so that generic manufacturers can establish the
bioequivalency of a generic substitute.”102
When the congressional record is considered as a whole, it becomes clear
that the Hatch-Waxman Act was tailored to achieve several purposes, and that
while all parties involved supported the bill, all parties also made
concessions.103 No party involved in the discussion viewed the safe harbor

97 See Senate Hearing, supra note 20, at 104–05 (statement of Lewis Engman, President, Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association) (noting that the experimental use exception was a point on which manufacturers of
patented drugs compromised to secure their patent term extensions).
98 See, e.g., id. at 221–22 (statement of Dan Saphire, American Association of Retired Persons) (noting
that the Act is beneficial in his view—despite extending the patent monopoly—because of the concessions
made to expedite generic drugs).
99 Though patent rights are impermanent, they are analogous to property rights and possibly subject to a
taking by the government—and arguably should be given heightened protection because they are time limited.
See U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also, e.g., Senate Hearing, supra note 20, at 147 (excerpts from statement by
John R. Stafford, President, American Home Products, before the House Judiciary Committee on H.R. 3605,
as amended, June 27, 1984).
100 See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 30 n.20, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2714 n.20.
101 H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 45 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2678, 1984 WL
37416.
102 H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 8, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2692 (rejecting amendments that
would limit infringing activity to the last year of the patent term).
103 Consumers and generic drug manufacturers approved the ANDA and safe harbor provisions but
disliked the patent term extension, while patented drug manufacturers only supported the bill because of the
patent term extension provision. See Senate Hearing, supra note 20.
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provision as anything more than an abrogation of Roche Products v. Bolar
Pharmaceuticals,104 and a quid pro quo for the patent term extension
provision.105
Reading the phrase “solely for uses reasonably related to the development
and submission of information” in light of the legislative record, it appears
Congress was establishing limitations on the safe harbor.106 Congress was
aware of the potential for an overly broad exception to raise the issue of an
unconstitutional “taking,” and thus limited the acceptable uses to those
“solely . . . reasonably related to the submission of information” to the FDA.107
By requiring that the uses be “solely” for development of information,
Congress intended to preclude uses that were purely commercial in nature. The
“reasonable relation” requirement is a recognition of how laboratory testing is
done—not every test will generate the necessary information, and some tests
will merely indicate that further testing is required. These requirements show
Congress intended for the safe harbor to cover drug development activities
leading up to FDA approval, and not beyond. Marketing approval by the FDA
should serve as an outermost boundary of the safe harbor exception. Thus, a
generic manufacturer’s actions (e.g., making, using, and testing) leading up to
FDA approval should be excused, but the same actions taken after FDA
approval would constitute actionable infringement.
While Congress spent much time debating the proper balance of interests
between patented and generic pharmaceutical manufacturers, Congress did not
address whether medical devices or “research tool” patents were covered by
the safe harbor. The FDA regulates medical devices, and they were included in
the types of patents granted term extensions by the Hatch-Waxman Act.108
“Research tool,” however, is a relatively new judicial classification for patents

104 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984), superseded by statute, Hatch-Waxman Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417,
§ 202, 98 Stat. 1585, 1603 (1984) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006)), as recognized in W.L. Gore &
Assocs., Inc. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 977 F.2d 558 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
105 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 45, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2678 (“The purpose of
section[] 271(e)(1) . . . is to establish that experimentation with a patented drug product, when the purpose is to
prepare for commercial activity which will begin after a valid patent expires, is not a patent infringement.”).
106 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). Congress did consider an amendment that would have altered this portion
by replacing the word “reasonably” with “directly,” but the difference between the two was not debated and
the amendment was rejected on other grounds. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 60, reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2719–20 (the Moorhead amendment).
107 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1); H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 8, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2692.
108 35 U.S.C. § 156(a), (f)(1)(B).
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whose primary use is within a laboratory.109 A research tool can be any
invention useful in conducting further investigation, and encompasses both
traditional laboratory equipment such as microscopes and new innovations
such as the use of an “expressed sequence tag” to isolate specific molecules.110
Because the FDA does not regulate research tools per se, they were not
included in Hatch-Waxman’s grant of patent term extensions. If Congress
intended to balance Hatch-Waxman’s benefits and burdens by providing safe
harbor protection only for those patents subject to patent term extensions, then
research tool patents should not qualify for the safe harbor.
Considering only the intent of Congress as expressed in legislative reports
and hearings, the scope of the safe harbor intended by Congress is limited to a
narrow set of patented inventions and for a narrow purpose. The set of patented
inventions eligible for the safe harbor are those “harmed” by time lost during
FDA approval, such as medical devices and pharmaceutical products. The
purpose of this exception is to save taxpayer money, and the purpose is
fulfilled when a generic version of a patented drug is approved for sale. By
permitting FDA approval to issue prior to the drug patent’s expiration,
Congress permitted free-market competition to begin as soon as the patent
expired. Any infringing actions taken after FDA approval are merely treading
on the patentee’s rights and raise the serious constitutional question of whether
a taking has occurred. Though the intent of Congress suggests a narrow
interpretation is most suitable given the delicate balancing of interests, the text
of the Hatch-Waxman Act is phrased in more expansive language.111
2. Textual Analysis of the Statute
Textual analysis of the Hatch-Waxman safe harbor begins by taking the
text of the statute at face value and interpreting any unclear terms through
reference to other portions of the statute.112 The Supreme Court has analyzed
the safe harbor provision’s text on two occasions, with both opinions written
by Justice Scalia.113 In Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., despite finding that
109 See, e.g., In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Rader, J., dissenting) (defending the
utility of research tools).
110 See id. at 1379–80.
111 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).
112 This is the approach used by Justice Scalia in Eli Lilly and Merck, and later used by Judge Moore in
Momenta. See Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic,
Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990); Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2012),
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2854 (2013).
113 Merck, 545 U.S. 193; Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. 661.
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the relevant text was “not plainly comprehensible,” Justice Scalia looked to the
structure of the statute to interpret the scope of the “Federal law which
regulates . . . drugs.”114 He found that to achieve a structural balance between
patent term extensions and the safe harbor exception to infringement, the “law”
referenced by the statute should be understood to be the regulatory scheme that
regulated all devices for which patent term extensions were granted.115 Later,
when interpreting the phrase “reasonably related,” Justice Scalia construed the
term “reasonably” to indicate that while the infringing use had to be of the sort
that would generate information for the FDA, the information produced did not
have to actually be included in submissions to the FDA.116 Justice Scalia did
not offer any guidance on whether “research tools” are protected by the safe
harbor exception.117
On its face, the statute does not indicate what sorts of patents are or are not
covered by the exception, but rather couches the exception in terms of how the
patented inventions are used.118 Every sort of infringing activity—making,
using, selling, offering to sell, and importing—is covered by the exception.119
Thus the limiting language of the safe harbor is that the infringement of the
patent must be “solely for uses reasonably related to the development and
submission of information” to the FDA.120 As discussed and analyzed below,
this language fails to provide a significant limitation on the scope of the safe
harbor.

114 Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 669, 673–74 (internal quotation mark omitted). Justice Scalia determined that
saying a “law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs” was a form of congressional shorthand
for the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act—the less plausible alternative was to find that Congress, with
this broad phrase, was singling out individual statutes regulating drugs, rather than the whole statutory scheme.
Id. (internal quotation mark omitted).
115 The Court considered the implication of interpreting this provision more narrowly—as applying to
only those specific statutes that regulated drugs—but rejected the narrow interpretations because medical
devices would be given patent term extensions and not be subject to the safe harbor. See id. at 669, 672–74.
116 Merck, 545 U.S. at 206–07.
117 Justice Scalia noted that although the issue was mentioned on appeal, it was not argued by either party,
and so he did not need to address it. See id. at 205 n.7.
118 Uses must be “reasonably related” to development and submission of information to the FDA. See 35
U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006).
119 This language parallels the definition of infringement, given in subsection (a) of the same section. See
id. § 271(a), (e)(1).
120 Id. § 271(e)(1); see also Brief of Amicus Curiae Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. in Support of the
Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 4–5, Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348 (Fed.
Cir. 2012) (Nos. 2012-1062, -1103, -1104), 2012 WL 4762489 (supporting en banc review of Momenta to read
“solely” and “submission” back into the statute).
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a. Does “Solely” Mean Only?
The dictionary defines “solely” as “not involving anyone or anything else;
only,”121 indicating that the infringing use must not be any use other than one
that is “reasonably related to the development and submission of information”
to the FDA.122 “Solely” is used elsewhere in Title 35, and in each case the
statute applies this dictionary definition.123 As it is used here, “solely” could
mean either of two things: (1) that the use of the patented invention must be
only for purposes of submitting information to the FDA, or (2) that the use of
the patented invention must be primarily for research purposes related to FDA
approval. This first possibility is incongruous with practical experience: some
uses may have more than one purpose. For example, experiments that
determine drug efficacy as required by the FDA may also help researchers
decide whether the drug is a viable candidate for further development.124
Requiring each “use” to be “solely” for submitting information to the FDA, to
the exclusion of any other purpose, could cause generic manufacturers to overdisclose information.125 This is likely too strict of a definition for “solely,”
because it is modified by “reasonably related,” suggesting that an appropriate
use may have more than one purpose.126
The second definition of “solely” raises a new problem: if “solely” does not
mean “only,” then can there be more than one purpose? The difficulty
introduced by this possibility of dual purposes is that it raises the question of
whether the “use” that is reasonably related must be the primary use. And if
not, to what degree are secondary uses permitted? This question would not
pose as great a difficulty if the statute stated that “only patents on FDAregulated inventions” qualified for the safe harbor.
If only FDA-regulated inventions were covered by the safe harbor, at least
some uses of these inventions would be mandated by the FDA—testing for
efficacy, bioequivalency, and purity, for example.127 It is almost tautological to
121

NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2010).
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).
123 See, e.g., id. §§ 156(e), 273(g), 299(b) (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (using the word “solely” in apparent
agreement with its dictionary definition).
124 See Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 206 (2005).
125 For example, applying this strict definition of “solely” could mean that data from a failed experiment
on a patented drug must be submitted to the FDA for the safe harbor to apply to the infringing acts which
constituted the experiment.
126 For a use to be “reasonably related” to any one purpose, it must also have another purpose—if there is
no secondary purpose, then it is “entirely related” to the first purpose and not merely “reasonably related.”
127 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2012) (requiring that the manufacturer establish bioequivalency).
122
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say that an FDA-mandated test bears a strong relation to an FDA submission,
and thus even though these uses may serve other purposes,128 they should be
covered by the safe harbor.
When considering inventions that are not regulated by the FDA, however,
the number of possible uses unrelated to FDA submissions is necessarily
higher, increasing the chance that any given use does not chiefly relate to an
FDA submission. A key justification for allowing infringing activities within
the safe harbor rests on the assumption that developing and submitting
information to the FDA is not the primary purpose of a patented invention.129
If Congress created an exception to infringement that divested patentees of
their chief benefit, that would be a compensable taking of property—therefore
the use Congress intended the safe harbor to cover must have been one that
would not greatly affect the patentee.130 Uses that lead up to FDA marketing
approval do not greatly affect the patentee unless they are uses of a patented
invention that is a research tool.
Research tools and FDA-regulated inventions perform different roles in the
pharmaceutical industry. For example, an advanced microscope—an archetype
for research tools131—would be sold to laboratories for their use in furthering
research on drugs, while the drugs themselves are mass-manufactured for
distribution to the public. The microscope fulfills its main purpose in the
laboratory setting, while the drug does not bring in revenue until it is sold.
Allowing an infringer to continually use a patented microscope for its intended
purpose serves to divest the patentee of all rights. Drugs and devices regulated
128

See supra text accompanying note 126.
The roots of this argument are found in the common law experimental use defense, which presumes
that activities that are “strictly philosophical” in nature are not detrimental to the patentees’ rights. Roche
Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984), superseded by statute, Hatch-Waxman
Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, § 202, 98 Stat. 1585, 1603 (1984) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006)), as
recognized in W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 977 F.2d 558 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Inventions that
present obvious exceptions to this assertion are research tools, whose primary use is actually to develop new
information—a means to an end rather than an end in themselves. Microscopes are a simple example of
research tools, but elaborate methods—such as those used for separating and sequencing DNA—may also be
considered tools in that their usefulness is in what they produce rather than the methods themselves. See In re
Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1379–80 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Rader, J., dissenting).
130 This is an application of the constitutional avoidance canon, where, presented with two interpretations,
the court should choose the one that does not raise a question of constitutionality. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young,
Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549,
1574 (2000) (citing Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 345 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring))
(critically analyzing the avoidance canon and its uses).
131 See In re Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1379–80 (Rader, J., dissenting) (relying on microscopes as prime
examples of research tools).
129
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by the FDA do not suffer from this problem, because their intended purpose is
not for developing other drugs. Thus research tools should not qualify for the
safe harbor exception, because their primary “use” might only be for
conducting research that would be used in pharmaceutical development.
b. How Reasonable Is “Reasonably Related”?
The closing portion of the safe harbor provision requires that the
submission be reasonably related to “the development and submission of
information” to the FDA.132 As analyzed below, this limitation on the safe
harbor’s scope bars only uses that are entirely unrelated to FDA submissions.
In an earlier version of the statute, to qualify for the safe harbor the
information had to be submitted “under a federal law which regulates the
approval of drugs,”133 but as enacted, the federal law only must “regulate[] the
manufacture, use, or sale of drugs.”134 This shift in language suggests a
broadening of the types of FDA submissions that qualify as valid grounds for
safe harbor protection. Despite being used in combination with the limitation
that the protected uses are “solely . . . reasonably related”135 to the
development of this information, requiring that the information be developed
for submission to the FDA is not a strong limitation. Many types of data are
required by the FDA through the various stages of the drug and medical device
approval process—from safety and efficacy to bioequivalence and adverse
reactions.136 During the drug approval process, information is actually
submitted to the FDA, while in later phases the information may simply be
compiled and never reported.137
The statute states that uses reasonably related to the “development and
submission” of information are exempted from infringement.138 This “and”
could be read conjunctively to mean that both development of information and
submission of information are required for the safe harbor exception to apply.

132

35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006).
See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 26 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2710, 1984 WL
37417 (emphasis added).
134 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).
135 Id.
136 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2012) (requiring that a new drug be bioequivalent to the prior approved
drug for purposes of filing an ANDA).
137 For example, information on adverse drug reactions is compiled but not submitted to the FDA, except
in response to an FDA request. See Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1070–72
(Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 973 (2013).
138 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).
133
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Though “and” is typically used conjunctively, context suggests that this is
improper in this case, both because of an impossibility139 and because of a
practical consideration.140 Therefore the “and” should be read disjunctively to
cover the actions of developing and submitting independently.
Taken together, the provision that the use must simply be “reasonably
related” to the “development and submission” of information under the FDCA
provides no significant limitation on what qualifies as a use under the safe
harbor. Only those uses that do not bear a reasonable relation to the
development of any information that the FDA could ever require are
disqualified.141
3. Policy Concerns Unique to Patent Law
In addition to considering the text of the safe harbor and intent of Congress
regarding the Hatch-Waxman Act, courts should also weigh the purposes
served by the Patent Act generally.142 Patent infringement is a strict liability
offense, and the application of the law tends to center around the themes of
notice and certainty.143 To fulfill the notice function of patent law, the rights
granted by a patent must mark off the metes and bounds of the patentee’s
property.144 By providing an exception to infringement, Congress created
incentives for manufacturers to quickly introduce generic drugs into the
marketplace without fear of the danger of an infringement suit.145 This safe
harbor must be limited to the minimum scope needed to achieve its purpose—
because it is an exception to the rule—and it must be grounded in the realities
139

It is impossible to submit information that has not been developed.
Not all information developed should be submitted, such as the data resulting from a failed
experiment.
141 “Any information” being any information that the FDA could conceivably request, and, as stated
earlier, this is a very large category of information. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
142 The Patent Act grants inventors the right to exclude others from practicing their inventions in
exchange for the inventors fully disclosing how their inventions work. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103, 112, 271(a)
(2006 & Supp. V 2011).
143 See, e.g., Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 15 (2000)
(“The importance of the notice function of the patent claim has always been appreciated, or at least understood
by judges on the Federal Circuit . . . .”).
144 See Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation Methodologies and Their Claim Scope
Paradigms, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49, 62–64 (2005) (“A patent claim seeks to inform the public of the
subject matter over which the patent provides exclusivity.” (citing Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
517 U.S. 370, 373 (1996))).
145 The Hatch-Waxman Act also created an “artificial” form of infringement triggered by filing an
ANDA, where the damages are limited to essentially preventing the generic from entering the marketplace. See
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2), (4).
140
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of the FDA approval process and laboratory research methods to ensure that it
gives the incentive Congress intended without overly encroaching on the
patent holder’s property rights.146
The certainty function of patent law requires that parties be subject to rules
that yield a predictable and repeatable result.147 Rules that require factor
balancing do not serve this function as well as bright-line rules. If an otherwise
infringing use of a patented invention could be exempted under the safe harbor
by labeling the use as “developing information for submission to the FDA,”148
then the certainty function of patent law has been subverted. The scope of safe
harbor protection would then depend on the at-trial arguments and
characterizations made by skilled attorneys and experts. On the other hand, if
only patents subject to FDA regulation were covered by the safe harbor, the
outcome of a safe harbor defense would be more certain.
In addition, applying the safe harbor to cover inventions regulated by the
FDA logically follows from the structure of the Hatch-Waxman Act.149 The
safe harbor and patent term extension provisions were created by the HatchWaxman Act in tandem, to correct for distortions caused by time lost during
FDA approval at either end of the patent term.150 However, allowing the safe
harbor to cover inventions not given patent term extensions in the Act creates a
new distortion in patent protection, and this distortion can affect patents
entirely unrelated to drugs. An additional benefit of restricting safe harbor
protection to the inventions regulated by the FDA is that the question of
whether the use is “reasonable” or “solely” for the purpose of submitting
information becomes easier to address.151
Considering the broader themes of patent law—notice and certainty—and
the structure of the Hatch-Waxman Act itself, it is clear that the safe harbor

146 See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 27–30 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2711–14,
1984 WL 37417.
147 See Craig Allen Nard, Certainty, Fence Building, and the Useful Arts, 74 IND. L.J. 759, 763 (1999)
(“A patent system, like any rights-based system, should seek to provide the players operating within the
system clearly defined guidance as to what is and is not acceptable behavior.”).
148 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006).
149 See Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 206 (2005).
150 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 669–70 (1990).
151 If the inventions’ primary purpose is for laboratory use, then it is hard to draw a line between
“reasonably related” use in submitting information to the FDA (for an unrelated drug) and use that is unrelated
to submitting information to the FDA. See Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348,
1353–60 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2854 (2013).
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must be subject to some limits to avoid creating additional distortions in patent
protection.
4. Proposed Scope of the Safe Harbor
The above analysis indicates that while a textual analysis of the language of
the safe harbor leads to a conclusion that the safe harbor is exceedingly broad,
this interpretation may yield results that are inapposite with the statute’s
legislative history and may raise constitutional questions.152 A proper scope of
the safe harbor statute would suffer from neither of these problems while
adhering to Supreme Court precedent. This Comment proposes a scope of the
safe harbor that is limited in time to those infringing acts occurring before
FDA marketing approval, and limited in subject to those patented inventions
that were granted patent term extensions by the Hatch-Waxman Act.153 This
scope adheres to Supreme Court precedent from Eli Lilly in extending the safe
harbor to all inventions given patent term extensions by the Hatch-Waxman
Act,154 but stops short of destroying the equilibrium intended by Congress that
would occur if all patents were covered.155 In addition, by covering only those
infringing activities prior to receiving FDA approval, this scope meshes with
the remainder of section 202 of the Hatch-Waxman Act, which concerns
infringement in the context of applications for FDA approval for sale prior to
the expiry of a patent.156 This temporal limitation would also provide the
bright-line certainty typically favored by the Federal Circuit.157
B. Divergence of this Scope from the Scope in Momenta
The scope of the safe harbor proposed by this Comment differs from that
applied by the Federal Circuit in Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Amphastar

152

See supra text accompanying note 130.
See 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
154 See Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 669–74.
155 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 8 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2692, 1984
WL 37417 (couching discussion of the subject matter exempted through the safe harbor in terms of generic
drugs and bioequivalency tests).
156 Various subsections deal with infringement based on the category a given patent falls in, and the
remedies available differ based on whether or not the approval for sale is being sought prior to patent
expiration or afterwards. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2), (4).
157 See, e.g., Timothy R. Holbrook, The Supreme Court’s Complicity in Federal Circuit Formalism, 20
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 2–4 (2003) (providing several illustrations of the Federal
Circuit’s bent toward certainty and formalism).
153
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Pharmaceuticals, Inc. in two ways.158 First, the majority in Momenta would
permit the safe harbor to cover activities conducted after FDA approval has
been granted,159 while the scope this Comment proposes would use FDA
approval as the cutoff point. Second, the Momenta majority would extend the
safe harbor to all patented inventions, including those for which no FDA
approval is required.160 The scope this Comment proposes would restrict the
safe harbor to only those inventions granted patent term extensions by the
Hatch-Waxman Act.161
Based on these two differences, a court applying this Comment’s proposed
scope would find that the infringing acts in Momenta would not qualify for the
safe harbor.162 The first basis for this holding would be that the safe harbor is
inapplicable to this type of patent. The patent infringed in Momenta was for a
method of determining the purity of a substance, and this type of patent is not
qualified for a patent term extension.163 Because it is ineligible for a patent
term extension, infringement of this patent would be ineligible for safe harbor
protection as proposed by this Comment.164 In addition, a holding that the safe
harbor does not apply to the infringer’s actions could also be based on the time
the actions occurred relative to FDA marketing approval.165 The infringer in
Momenta had already received FDA approval to sell the drug, but continued to
use the patented testing method as it produced batches of the drug for sale to
the public.166 While the preapproval uses were necessary to develop
bioequivalency data, the later uses were chiefly for producing marketable
quantities of the drug.167 According to the scope proposed by this Comment,
these later uses would not qualify for the safe harbor.168

158 See Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert.
denied, 133 S. Ct. 2854 (2013) (expanding the scope of the safe harbor to cover infringing acts performed both
(1) with any sort of invention and (2) after FDA approval was granted).
159 Id.
160 See id.
161 See 35 U.S.C. § 156.
162 See Momenta, 686 F.3d at 1351–52.
163 See id.
164 See supra Part II.A.4.
165 See Momenta, 686 F.3d at 1351–52.
166 Id.
167 See id.
168 See supra text accompanying note 153.
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III. BROADER IMPLICATIONS OF THE SCOPE OF THE SAFE HARBOR
Aside from the two cases decided by the Supreme Court,169 most of the
interpretation of the safe harbor provision has been accomplished through the
decisions of the Federal Circuit.170 Through the broad language employed in its
decision in Momenta,171 the Federal Circuit has threatened the value of an
entire field of patents and has implicitly overturned portions of its precedent.172
A. Future Impacts the Broad Holding in Momenta Will Have for Patent
Holders and Inventors
The broad scope given to the safe harbor by Momenta will likely change
the actions of generic pharmaceutical manufacturers, who will adopt
aggressive business strategies to take advantage of the reduced enforcement
power of patentees.173 The topic of research tools has been an open question
since Justice Scalia raised the issue in Merck.174 Though the Federal Circuit
has previously held that they should not be covered by the safe harbor,175 the
tenor of Momenta is to the contrary.176 This shift moves the balance struck in
the Hatch-Waxman Act strongly toward the side of the generic
manufacturers.177 Now manufacturers may begin using patented research tools

169

Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc.,
496 U.S. 661 (1990).
170 See Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1070–73 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert.
denied, 133 S. Ct. 973 (2013); Proveris Scientific Corp. v. Innovasystems, Inc., 536 F.3d 1256 (Fed. Cir.
2008); AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1029 (Fed. Cir. 1997), amended by 131 F.3d 1009 (Fed.
Cir. 1997).
171 Momenta, 686 F.3d at 1354–56.
172 Compare Proveris, 536 F.3d at 1264–66 (holding that “research tools” are not covered by the safe
harbor because they are not subject to FDA regulation), with Momenta, 686 F.3d at 1359 (holding that the safe
harbor may cover any patented invention).
173 See Momenta, 686 F.3d at 1359.
174 See Merck, 545 U.S. at 205 n.7 (“We therefore need not—and do not—express a view about whether,
or to what extent, § 271(e)(1) exempts from infringement the use of ‘research tools’ in the development of
information for the regulatory process.”).
175 See Proveris, 536 F.3d at 1264–66 (holding that “research tools” are not covered by the safe harbor
because they are not subject to FDA regulation).
176 See Momenta, 686 F.3d at 1359 (holding that the determinative factor was whether use of the patented
invention was “reasonably related” to an FDA submission).
177 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 45 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2678, 1984
WL 37416 (“The purpose of section[] 271(e)(1) . . . is to establish that experimentation with a patented drug
product, when the purpose is to prepare for commercial activity which will begin after a valid patent expires, is
not a patent infringement.” (emphasis added)).
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to aid in their development of new drugs or generic drugs without regard to
whether noninfringing methods are available.178
The most dangerous change brought about through the Momenta decision
is that now, as never before, post-approval infringement is covered by the safe
harbor.179 This coverage—which applies to ANDA and new drugs alike—is far
removed from the original purpose found in the congressional record, which
was focused on protecting the consumers by bringing generics to the market
swiftly, following the expiration of a drug patent.180
These two changes create a perfect storm for owners of patents on research
tools: not only can such patents be infringed at the will of a manufacturer in
bringing a drug to market, but the manufacturer can continue to infringe the
research tool patent while selling the drug. At a minimum, the developers of
new research tools and methods will need to consider these changes when
deciding whether a patent is a worthwhile investment, or if a trade secret might
be more effective.181 While trade secrets provide less opportunity to extract
license fees and fund future invention, at least the inventor will save the
trouble of securing a patent that is worth less than the paper it is printed on.
This state of affairs will be detrimental initially only to the holders of these
research tool patents. However, as new inventors are faced with the decision of
disclosing their research tools through applying for patents—thereby giving up
information in return for little protection—or instead retaining them as trade
secrets, a different form of harm may occur. Many inventors may choose to
keep their inventions secret, which would slow if not stifle innovation.182 By
setting the stage for this scenario, the unduly broad scope of the safe harbor in

178 Momenta, 686 F.3d at 1359 (“The safe harbor . . . does not mandate the use of a noninfringing
alternative when one exists.”).
179 Compare Momenta, 686 F.3d at 1359 (allowing the safe harbor to cover post-approval activities), with
Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1071–72 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (excluding postapproval activities from the safe harbor), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 973 (2013).
180 See Senate Hearing, supra note 20, at 1–2 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch, Chairman, S. Comm. on
Labor & Human Resources) (“[O]ur people are paying too much for drugs whose patents have expired.”).
181 Trade secrets are governed by state law and protect inventions from corporate espionage, but not
against reverse engineering or independent development. See, e.g., E. I. duPont deNemours & Co. v.
Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1015 (5th Cir. 1970). Thus, they are not as effective for consumer-side inventions
(e.g., commercial products) as they are for manufacturing-side inventions (e.g., methods).
182 This is at odds with Congress’s power to promote and protect innovation. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 8.
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Momenta subverts both the ex ante and ex post incentives provided by patent
law.183
B. Pathways for Implementing the Proposed Scope of the Safe Harbor
The scope of the safe harbor proposed by this Comment would produce
results both in line with the expectations of the pharmaceutical community
(prior to the Momenta decision) and in conformance with binding Supreme
Court and Federal Circuit precedent.184 The pharmaceutical community—both
patented drug makers and generic manufacturers—was deeply involved in the
negotiations and passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act, and has had a strong
monetary interest in the scope of the safe harbor over the nearly three decades
since.185 The scope of the safe harbor as proposed by this Comment would not
disturb the expectations of this community, but instead would explicitly
reinforce the balance enacted in the Hatch-Waxman Act. By limiting the types
of patents eligible for safe harbor protection to those granted patent term
extensions,186 this scope would retain the “structural” equilibrium recognized
in Eli Lilly.187 This means that the only patents “harmed” by the safe harbor—
in that they may be infringed—are also given a “benefit” in the form of
additional years of patent protection to make up for time lost during the FDA
approval process.
Restricting the scope of the safe harbor further to address only those acts of
infringement prior to FDA approval, although more limited than the broad
language employed by the statute, also achieves the results Congress
intended.188 The safe harbor portion of the Hatch-Waxman Act was intended in
183 Ex ante incentives are those that encourage inventors to develop new ideas; ex post are those that
encourage inventors to disclose the ideas.
184 Where the Supreme Court has issued dicta that do not explicitly agree with Federal Circuit precedent,
this Comment applies the precedential decision. Compare Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545
U.S. 193, 205 n.7 (2005) (eschewing any holding on whether research tools are eligible for the safe harbor
exemption), with Proveris Scientific Corp. v. Innovasystems, Inc., 536 F.3d 1256, 1264–66 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(holding that the safe harbor does not cover research tools).
185 The value of market exclusivity for a pharmaceutical product can be enormous, and the presence of
competition can bring this value much closer to marginal cost. See Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar
Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Rader, C.J., dissenting) (finding the value of market
exclusivity was approximately $520 million over a six-month period), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2854 (2013); see
also House Hearing, supra note 90, at 43 (statement of Kenneth N. Larsen, Chairman, Generic Pharmaceutical
Industry Association) (bidding among manufacturers drove many drug prices down more than 50%).
186 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
187 See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 669 (1990).
188 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 45 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2678, 1984
WL 37416 (“The purpose of section[] 271(e)(1) . . . is to establish that experimentation with a patented drug
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part to overturn Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,189 which
had the effect of defining the FDA application process as “commercial,” and
thus beyond the scope of the judicially created “experimental use” defense.190
If the safe harbor is limited to covering only pre–FDA approval activities, it
serves as a replacement for the experimental use defense in this field of
innovation—encouraging others to improve upon the patented invention
without trespassing on the patentee’s rights.191
Despite these benefits, shaping the scope of the safe harbor to a more
narrow, pre-Momenta form will not be an easy task, though options exist both
for judicial and legislative intervention. One avenue for judicial review has
been closed: despite the tension between Classen and Momenta and the
uncertain scope of the safe harbor, the Supreme Court has denied certiorari in
both cases. The other avenue would have the Federal Circuit take up Momenta
en banc to amend the decision of the panel and adopt a single precedential
interpretation. Until the Federal Circuit takes this issue en banc, whether in
Momenta or in the next case to raise the issue, the outcome at the Federal
Circuit will depend on the makeup of the three-judge panel.192
Another problem with relying on judicial review and reform for the safe
harbor is that the current trend in statutory interpretation is textualism, which
looks first to the text of the statute and applies the text as written unless there is
some ambiguity with the text. The safe harbor has been interpreted through this
method before—twice by Justice Scalia,193 a leader in the textualist

product, when the purpose is to prepare for commercial activity which will begin after a valid patent expires, is
not a patent infringement.”).
189 Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“[U]nlicensed
experiments conducted with a view to the adaptation of the patented invention to the experimentor’s business
is a violation of the rights of the patentee to exclude others from using his patented invention.”), superseded by
statute, Hatch-Waxman Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, § 202, 98 Stat. 1585, 1603 (1984) (codified at 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(e)(1) (2006)), as recognized in W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 977 F.2d 558 (Fed. Cir.
1992).
190 The “experimental use” defense has been circumscribed severely, covering only infringement
performed “for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry.” Id. (citing Pitcairn v.
United States, 547 F.2d 1106, 1125–26 (Ct. Cl. 1976)).
191 This is the opposite of the effect felt when the safe harbor has no limitation. See supra text
accompanying note 183.
192 Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 87, at 1112.
193 Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc.,
496 U.S. 661 (1990).
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movement194—and its broad language has been pronounced clear.195 Without
an ambiguous text, a textualist finds no motivation to seek out the intentions of
Congress as expressed in the legislative history. In terms of the safe harbor
provision, the legislative history provides a perspective on the intent of
Congress that is not evident from the text—a perspective that may not be given
effect if this provision is viewed only from a textualist standpoint. For this
reason, congressional intervention will likely be required for the safe harbor to
be returned to its former scope.
CONCLUSION
The safe harbor performs a necessary role in pharmaceutical innovation: it
encourages generic manufacturers and new drug makers to experiment with
patented drugs, free from the fear of liability for patent infringement. Stretched
beyond its proper scope, however, the safe harbor threatens the value of
patents related to drug manufacturing, and in turn, threatens the innovation
those patents represent. To prevent this harm from occurring, the safe harbor
should be limited in subject matter to covering only those patents that are
granted patent term extensions,196 and to infringing acts taken prior to FDA
approval.197 Because of the broad language used in the safe harbor provision,
these limitations are difficult to envision as judicial constructs—especially in a
textualist climate—and will likely require congressional action to become a
reality.
ROBERT A. JONES∗

194 Justice Scalia is well known for his outspoken stance for textualist interpretations and against detailed
reviews of legislative histories. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRIAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012) (dedicating an entire book to the subject of textualist interpretation).
195 Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Congress
could not have been clearer in its choice of words . . . .”), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2854 (2013).
196 This offsets the benefit of a term extension with the burden of possibly unchecked infringement.
197 FDA approval is a very useful milestone: to qualify for the safe harbor, submissions to the FDA are
involved, and after FDA approval, the uses of the patent begin to compete with the patent-owners’ monopoly.
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